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I. INTRODUCTION
Finding a happy medium is hard. Often, it is a challenge to find a
workable balance between two unworkable extremes. Known as the
“Goldilocks Principle,” this phenomenon has been observed in fields
as diverse as developmental psychology and astrobiology.1 As Goldi-
locks found in the Three Bears’ house, “just right” may not come on
the first attempt. We may have to explore the extremes of the spec-
trum—“too hot” and “too cold”—before we can settle on “just right.”
* J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M School of Law.
1. Goldilocks Principle, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldilocks_principle [https://perma.cc/XJ93-Z4T9] (last visited
July 24, 2016).
209
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Goldilocks also discovered that this process is all the more difficult in
a new environment—like the Three Bears’ house. Goldilocks perse-
vered, however, until she found “just right.”
Federal courts face a similar dilemma in the private search excep-
tion to warrant requirements under the Fourth Amendment. On one
hand are legitimate individual privacy interests and on the other, the
legitimate interests of law enforcement to protect society. Courts must
not handcuff law enforcement agents in their duties in the name of
individual privacy (“too cold”), but neither should they unreasonably
curtail individual liberty by giving too much latitude to legitimate gov-
ernment interests (“too hot”). It is no small task to identify an appro-
priate compromise between the competing principles of protecting the
privacy of American citizens and protecting American citizens from
crime. Like Goldilocks, courts today also face this challenge in an un-
familiar world. What is the “just right” application of the private
search exception in the world of digital storage devices, which hold
staggeringly large amounts of data and whose structure challenges
traditional Fourth Amendment concepts?
The Fourth Amendment directs that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.2
The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test to determine
whether law enforcement violates this requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.3 First, the Court asks whether the law enforcement ac-
tion constitutes a “search.”4 The action is only a Fourth Amendment
search “when the government violates a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”5 If the government con-
ducted a search, the Court then decides whether the search was
reasonable—by its text, the Fourth Amendment forbids the govern-
ment from “unreasonable” searches.6 Outside of certain specific ex-
ceptions, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.7 If there is no
“search,” therefore, the reasonableness of the act is not an issue—and
no warrant is required.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–33 (2001).
4. Id. (analyzing the “antecedent question of whether or not a Fourth Amend-
ment ‘search’ has occurred”).
5. Id. at 33 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (quoting Katz, 389
U.S. at 357).
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The distinction between what is and is not a search comes to the
fore when private citizens disclose information to the police. Under
these circumstances, courts apply the so-called “private search doc-
trine.” The Fourth Amendment applies only to government action.8 A
private party’s act, therefore, can never be a “search” under Fourth
Amendment analysis, no matter how unreasonable9 or unlawful.10
Under the private search doctrine, law enforcement may recreate a
third party’s investigation without triggering a Fourth Amendment
“search” so long as they do not exceed the scope of the private
search.11 If law enforcement stays within the scope of the private
search, therefore, they do not require a warrant.12 However, if law
enforcement exceeds the scope of the private search, they initiate a
Fourth Amendment search, and must obtain a warrant13 or have the
fruits of their search excluded at trial.14
In practice, courts commonly define the scope of a private search in
terms of containers—from brown paper bags15 to luggage16 to camera
lens cases.17 Unless previously opened by a private party, each new
container opened triggers a new search by law enforcement.18 In some
cases, a private party might look through only some of the contents of
a container before turning it over to the police. The police, however,
may search deliberately and exhaustively through that container.19
8. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (citing United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113–14 (1984)).
9. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 at 114–15.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003) (permitting gov-
ernment use of information illegally hacked by a private party); United States v. Stei-
ger, 318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003) (permitting the same).
11. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119 (“it hardly infringed respondents’ privacy for the
agents to re-examine the contents of the open package by brushing aside a crumpled
newspaper and picking up the tube”); United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610
(11th Cir. 1990) (federal agents did not exceed the scope of prior private search “sim-
ply because they took more time and were more thorough than [the private party]”).
12. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117–18 (stating that a “search” takes place “only if the
authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not
already been frustrated”). See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (noting
that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable).
13. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117–18.
14. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 28 (1949)). But see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (stating the
exclusionary rule applies “only where it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence’”).
15. See, e.g., Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 541–42 (1990) (per curiam).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1435–36 (10th Cir. 1991).
18. See id. at 1438 (a container’s contents are typically only revealed by opening it,
not based on its “incriminating character”); United States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863, 866
(4th Cir. 1992) (police’s search of a small white bag in a closet not supported by a
private party’s opening other bags in the closet); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d
449, 463 (5th Cir. 2001) (“police exceed the scope of a prior private search when they
examine a closed container that was not opened by the private searchers . . . .”).
19. See United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 1990) (sanctioning a
federal search of a container already opened by a private party even though federal
agents “took more time and were more thorough than [the private party]”).
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Courts have historically treated digital storage devices as simply an-
other form of container.20 In the modern world, however, private in-
formation is more and more likely to be stored in digital form, and
storage devices for such information grow larger and larger. There-
fore, as the application of the private search doctrine in the context of
the digital world is becoming more commonplace, the significance of
correctly applying the doctrine is increasingly heightened. It is excep-
tionally important, therefore, that courts apply the private search doc-
trine “just right”—restrictively enough to protect personal privacy
while applying it liberally enough to further the legitimate goals of law
enforcement.
On this spectrum of personal privacy and law enforcement, courts
have tended to gather at the extremes. Most courts have treated the
digital storage device as a unitary container. This approach has come
to apply the private search doctrine so broadly that it endangers the
right to privacy embodied by the Fourth Amendment. On the other
extreme stands the Sixth Circuit, who most recently considered this
issue in United States v. Lichtenberger.21 Although the Sixth Circuit
did not explicitly address the container doctrine, the court impliedly
limited the container to the individual file. The court held that an of-
ficer exceeded the private search’s scope because he could not be cer-
tain that he viewed only those files that the private party viewed.22
The Sixth Circuit settled firmly on the restrictive end of the spectrum
in resolving this issue.23 In the interest of protecting individual pri-
vacy, however, the Sixth Circuit’s decision will hamstring law enforce-
ment and effectively obliterate the private search doctrine in the
digital context. How courts resolve the issue of digital container size in
future decisions will largely shape the fate of the private search doc-
trine in the digital world.
This Note recommends a third option to analyze warrantless police
searches under the private search doctrine. Specifically, courts should
define the container as the virtual file folder (or folders) containing
the data actually viewed by the private searcher. This “just right” ap-
proach avoids both the “too hot” traditional approach and the “too
cold” of the strict approach. A virtual file folder concept would appro-
20. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 458 (assuming without deciding that computer disks are
Fourth Amendment containers because neither party contested the point); Rann v.
Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 836–37 (7th Cir. 2012) (adopting Runyan’s approach to digital
storage devices); United States v. Harling, No. 2:13-cr-96-FtM-38CM, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 107398, at *9–10 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2014) (identifying thumb drives as closed
containers).
21. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015). In fact, it may be
one of the only circuits to consider the issue in the last ten years. See Runyan, 275
F.3d 449.
22. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 488–89.
23. Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit held that the police search exceeded the scope
of the private search because of the vast potential privacy interest at risk. It is not
clear that this is the appropriate way to consider the issue.
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priately guard individual privacy rights while preserving law enforce-
ment’s ability to utilize volunteered evidence. Such a middle ground
would additionally provide courts with discretion to expand or restrict
the scope of the private search as the circumstances warrant, consis-
tent with the fact-intensive “reasonableness” criteria of the Fourth
Amendment.24
Part II of this Note reviews the history of the private search excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and its place
within the historical goals of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as
well as the relevant background of modern computer technology. In
Part III, this Note looks at current applications of the private search
doctrine to digital storage, noting difficulties with each approach. Fi-
nally, in Part IV, this Note recommends an appropriately balanced
approach and responds to some potential counterarguments.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Private Search Exception
The Supreme Court has consistently construed the Fourth Amend-
ment as inapplicable to citizens acting in their individual capacities.25
Instead, the Fourth Amendment prohibits government actors (federal
agents as well as state and local law enforcement) from conducting
unreasonable searches and seizures.26 This limitation on the applica-
tion of the Fourth Amendment leads naturally to what is known as the
private search exception. Law enforcement may utilize information
volunteered by third parties even if obtained under circumstances that
would have violated the Fourth Amendment had law enforcement
conducted the search.27 Thus, the Fourth Amendment does not apply
“to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a pri-
vate individual” so long as the private party is truly acting in a private
capacity and not as an agent of the state or with its sanction.28
Law enforcement may not use a private party’s search, however, to
frustrate the underlying purpose of the Fourth Amendment—prevent-
ing general searches.29 If a private party performs an exhaustive
search, law enforcement may utilize all of that information.30 How-
24. See, e.g., discussion infra Section IV.B.1.
25. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
26. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949) (holding the Fourth Amend-
ment applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause).
27. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117.
28. Id. at 113–14 (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
29. See infra Section II.A.1.
30. See United States v. Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226, 1240 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying the
private search doctrine to a search by the British government and upholding the ad-
mission of all evidence because the British search was exhaustive).
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ever, the government may not use a private search as an excuse to
conduct its own general search.31 Faithful to the spirit of the Fourth
Amendment,32 the private search exception allows for only limited
searches.
In United States v. Jacobsen, the Supreme Court laid the foundation
for the private search exception as it is applied today. Federal Express
(“FedEx”) employees examined a damaged package at their Minne-
apolis-St. Paul office.33 Inside, they discovered a tube, which a man-
ager cut open to reveal three zip-lock plastic bags containing white
powder.34 The manager and employees called the DEA after placing
the plastic bags back in the tube and the tube back in the damaged
box.35 When the DEA agent arrived, he removed the tube from the
open box and the zip-lock bags from the tube.36 The agent also field-
tested each of the bags, determining that the white powder in each
was cocaine.37 The DEA obtained and executed arrest warrants on
the intended recipients of the package.38 At trial, the defendants
moved to suppress the evidence as the result of an illegal search and
seizure.39
The Supreme Court held that the DEA agent’s actions at the FedEx
office were not subject to the Fourth Amendment. The intended re-
cipient of the package possessed a legitimate privacy interest in the
package.40 Although using information in which there is a legitimate,
unfrustrated privacy interest implicates the Fourth Amendment,41 any
additional invasions beyond a private search “must be tested by the
degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search.”42 In
Jacobsen, the DEA agent merely protected against the risk that a
third party misdescribed the contents of an unsealed container
searched by the third party and made freely available to law enforce-
ment.43 Any legitimate privacy interest in the package had been frus-
trated by the private search.44 The DEA agent’s acts, therefore, did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.45 The DEA had not conducted a
“search” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, the
31. See infra Section II.A.1.
32. See infra Section II.A.1.




37. Id. at 111–12.
38. Id. at 112.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 114; see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982) (stating
that “the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container
that conceals its contents from plain view”).
41. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117.
42. Id. at 115.
43. Id. at 119.
44. Id. at 121.
45. Id.
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Court held that the field test on the white powder in the zip-lock bags
did not infringe a legitimate privacy interest.46 Although this field test
did exceed the private search’s scope,47 the test could only reveal
whether the white powder was contraband, and no other potentially
private information.48
The private search exception can dramatically change the balance
between government interests and a government intrusion into pri-
vacy. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens’ expectations of pri-
vacy in matters “that society is prepared to consider reasonable.”49
But a private search can reduce or eliminate that reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, thereby freeing law enforcement from Fourth Amend-
ment constraints.50 Under the private search exception, the court
considers an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy after tak-
ing the private search into account.51  In other words, given what a
private party’s search has revealed—is there any remaining reasonable
privacy expectation? After a private search, it may be that a container
“no longer support[s] any expectation of privacy.”52 Because it can
dramatically reduce or completely eliminate an otherwise reasonable
expectation of privacy, the private search exception to the Fourth
Amendment is a powerful tool of law enforcement.
Since Jacobsen, courts apply the private search exception as a two-
part test, balancing privacy interests against law enforcement inter-
ests.53 First, the court determines whether the government search ex-
ceeded the scope of the original search54—unless the government
agent exceeds the scope of the private search, there can be no Fourth
Amendment “search.”55 If the government does exceed the scope of
the private search, the court then examines the facts of the case to
discover whether law enforcement infringed any remaining unfrus-
trated legitimate expectation of privacy following the private search.56
The police are not prevented from utilizing information gathered from
third parties,57 therefore, because the owner of information discov-
ered by or revealed to a third party no longer has a reasonable expec-
46. Id. at 123.
47. Id. at 122.
48. Id. at 122–23.
49. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ja-
cobsen, 466 U.S. at 113).
50. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117.
51. See id. at 126 (stating that “federal agents did not infringe any constitutionally
protected privacy interest that had not already been frustrated as the result of private
conduct”) (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
53. See id. at 122.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 113.
56. Id. at 115.
57. Id. at 117.
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tation of privacy in it.58 And it may be that the information revealed
to the police will frustrate the owner’s expectation of privacy in other
information as well.59 So, only if law enforcement exceeds the scope of
the private search and infringes some still unfrustrated privacy interest
will the evidence of the search be excluded. Thus, “[t]he Fourth
Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with
respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been
frustrated.”60
1. Containers and the Scope of the Private Search
The Fourth Amendment stands in defiance of general search war-
rants, which were sanctioned by the British monarchy before the
American Revolution.61 Under a general search warrant, the authori-
ties were unrestricted in searching a person’s belongings and effects.62
Evidence thus discovered—even evidence of unsuspected crimes—
could be used by the Crown against its owner.63 In order to secure
American citizens in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects,”64 the
Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment to limit government
searches to the particular area and items described in a warrant.65 This
particularity requirement prevents general government searches.66
Consistent with this purpose, government action under the private
search exception is similarly limited. The government must limit its
searches to the scope of a previous private search.67 Without this limit,
government actors could take limited information provided by third
parties and radically expand on that private search without obtaining
a warrant based on probable cause. In other words, without this limi-
tation, government actors would be able to use the private search doc-
trine to perform a general search. Limiting the scope of the
government search thus serves the same purpose as the particularity
requirement for warrant searches—protecting against a general
search.68
58. Id.
59. See generally id. (discussing a private search of a package that revealed baggies
of white powder and holding that under such circumstances the private search had
removed any reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the baggies—later
determined to be cocaine).
60. Id. at 117.
61. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–25 (1886); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
62. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1965).
63. See id.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65. Id.
66. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,
565 (2005). See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467.
67. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 116 (1984)).
68. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980).
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The scope of a private search may be defined by reference to the
“container doctrine”—the opening of a container by a private party
frustrates the reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the
contents therein.69 Because there is no Fourth Amendment “search”
without a legitimate expectation of privacy, a private search of a
container allows a state actor free access to the container.70 A govern-
ment agent is generally free to search—and search more thoroughly—
the contents of a previously searched container without implicating
the Fourth Amendment.71
The Fourth Amendment protects objects in which individuals have
manifested an expectation of privacy “that society recognizes as rea-
sonable.”72 A container manifests such an expectation, so long as the
container “conceals its contents from plain view.”73 A broad spectrum
of containers sufficiently conceal their contents to afford Fourth
Amendment protection: purses;74 briefcases;75 duffel bags;76 file fold-
ers;77 and cardboard boxes.78
When applying the Fourth Amendment, opening each distinct
container is a new “search” for the purposes of the court’s analysis.79
An independent search begins when the government agent further in-
vades the property owner’s interest.80 Contents of a closed container
typically demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy,81 and thus
require an independent justification to overcome the safeguards of the
69. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). See United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610
(11th Cir. 1990) (stating that a more thorough search of a container already opened
by a private party does not exceed the scope of a private search). See also United
States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that police did not exceed the
scope of a private search when going through a bag of firearms previously opened by
the owner’s girlfriend, but the police did exceed the scope of that private search when
they opened a second bag in the same closet which the girlfriend had not previously
opened). But see United States v. Rouse, 148 F.3d 1040 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
police exceeded the scope of a private search when they examined all the contents of
luggage partially searched by airline employees).
70. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (stating that the expectation of privacy is
frustrated to the extent that a third party has already searched, so a government ac-
tion is not a “search” so long as it stays within the scope of the private search).
71. Simpson, 904 F.2d at 610.
72. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
73. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982) (citing Robbins v. Califor-
nia, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981) (plurality opinion)).
74. E.g., United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1993).
75. E.g., United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 838 (7th Cir. 2000).
76. E.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336 (2000).
77. E.g., United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1321 (2d Cir. 1994).
78. E.g., United States v. Fultz, 146 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 1998).
79. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 462–63 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
United States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1992)); United States v. Donnes,
947 F.2d 1430, 1436 (10th Cir. 1991).
80. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
81. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981) (plurality opinion) (quoting
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977)).
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Fourth Amendment.82 A private party’s search of a container, there-
fore, frustrates the privacy expectation in the items within the
container, but not without.83
The container doctrine is often tied together with the concept that
individuals cannot reasonably have a privacy expectation in items in
“plain view.”84 By extension, neither can a container that “unmistaka-
bly reveal[s] its contents” sustain a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.85 The contents of containers that are open, see-through, or have
a distinctive character or shape are effectively in “plain view.”86 When
a container declares its contents to the world, as it were, it cannot
support a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Once a container is opened, however, the expectation of privacy is
frustrated with respect to all of its contents, regardless of whether all
the contents are technically exposed to “plain view.” When a private
party invites law enforcement to view an unsealed open container,
there is no remaining privacy interest in that container.87 Law enforce-
ment may view what a third party has made available to them, there-
fore, without violating the Fourth Amendment.88 Because the owner’s
expectation of privacy in an open container is frustrated, police may
also take more time and search the container more thoroughly with-
out implicating the Fourth Amendment.89
Within the context of a private search, this means that law enforce-
ment searches are restricted to the particular container searched by
the private party. Evidence discovered through the efforts of a private
party no longer retains a reasonable expectation of privacy, and there-
fore police examination of such evidence is not a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment. But the contents of a still-unopened container
retain that reasonable expectation, in spite of physical proximity90 or
apparent culpability.91
82. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980) (“[T]he Government may
not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an indepen-
dent search.”).
83. But see infra Section II.A.2.
84. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979). See also United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 131 (1984) (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). Cf. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its
contents from plain view.”).
85. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 129 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 822–23).
86. United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting United
States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir. 1992)).
87. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121.
88. Id. at 119–20 (first citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487–90
(1971); then citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475–76 (1921)).
89. United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 1990).
90. See United States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1992).
91. See United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1439 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that
a closed camera lens case still exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy, although
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2. Remaining Unfrustrated Expectation of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment inquiry does not end by determining that
law enforcement has exceeded the scope of a private search. Unless
the property owner still retains some expectation of privacy that soci-
ety is prepared to consider reasonable, a search beyond the scope of
that private search (for the purposes of this Note, beyond the confines
of the container) would not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Jacobsen provides a clear example of the frustration-of-privacy ex-
pectation beyond the scope of the private search. The Supreme Court
described this as “virtual certainty” about the subject of the additional
search.92 There, FedEx employees searched a damaged package pur-
suant to company policy.93 After opening the cardboard box wrapped
in brown paper, the employees discovered a tube beneath layers of
newspaper.94 Inside this tube were several plastic bags full of white
powder.95 After the employees contacted the DEA, an agent opened
the plastic bags, which had not been opened by the FedEx employees,
and determined by field test that the powder inside was cocaine.96
The Court held first that the agent’s reexamination of the package
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the agent could be
virtually certain of the packages contents based on the employees’
comments to the agent.97 Therefore the agent “merely avoid[ed] the
risk of a flaw in the employees’ recollection,” instead of infringing any
remaining reasonable expectation of privacy.98 Secondly, the Court
held that the agent’s field test of the white powder contained in the
package was reasonable based on employee statements, the circum-
stances of the search, and the agent’s expertise.99 “[T]he package
could no longer support any expectation of privacy” and therefore the
agent did not violate the Fourth Amendment in exceeding the scope
of the employees’ search.100 Jacobsen provides very straightforward
examples of circumstances in which an otherwise reasonable expecta-
tion was nullified. In other cases involving both physical and digital
searches, however, courts have identified a variety of circumstances in
which a party’s reasonable expectation of privacy was lessened or
eliminated.101
it was found in a glove along with a syringe, giving the officer only a “strong basis to
infer” that the case contained contraband).
92. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119.
93. Id. at 111.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 111–12.
97. Id. at 119.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 121.
100. Id. at 121–22.
101. See United States v. Harling, No. 2:13-cr-96-FtM-38CM, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 107398, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2014) (holding that a private party’s discov-
ery of child porn on two thumb drives and claim that they had seen child porn on a
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Elaborating on Jacobsen, the Fifth Circuit explained that the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in a container’s contents could be frus-
trated based on “the statements of the private searchers, [law
enforcement’s] replication of the private search, and their exper-
tise.”102 Alternatively, if an unopened container’s “contents were ren-
dered obvious by the private search,” then the police may be
“substantially certain” of the contents of the container, and opening
the container would not violate the Fourth Amendment.103 In other
words, “substantial certainty” is one—but not the only—way in which
circumstances may frustrate any remaining privacy interest, thereby
excusing law enforcement action from Fourth Amendment regulation.
B. The Problem of Modern Digital Storage
Technology seems to develop at an exponential pace. This may be
best evidenced by the sheer space available for data storage. In 2014,
Western Digital’s subsidiary, HGST, released a ten terabyte hard
drive for public sale104—an amount of storage equivalent to 647 mil-
lion pages of Microsoft Word documents or almost 6.7 billion pages of
plain text.105 IBM’s RAMAC was developed in the 1950s, in contrast,
and stored approximately five megabytes of data.106 Weighing in at
more than two thousand pounds, the RAMAC completely dwarfs
hard drives today.107 The shrinking size and growing capacity of digital
storage has made it a mainstay in modern society. More than 80% of
American households own a home computer of some type—more
third was sufficient to frustrate the owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the
third thumb drive); Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming a
thorough police search of digital storage devices delivered to the police by private
parties based on the parties’ description of the contents—child porn—without precise
knowledge of the “scope” of the private search); United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397,
407–08 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding the contents of a notebook delivered to the police
were within the scope of the private search based on the title on the cover, a loose
sheet of paper protruding from the side of the notebook, and the defendant’s admis-
sion of his role in a fraudulent unemployment benefits scheme).
102. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 463 (5th Cir. 2001).
103. Id. at 463–64; see also Rann, 689 F.3d at 837–38.
104. Lucas Mearian, WD Leapfrogs Seagate with World’s Highest Capacity 10TB




105. How Many Pages in a Gigabyte?, LEXISNEXIS, https://www.lexisnexis.com/ap
plieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADI_FS_PagesInAGigabyte.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/Q6CM-6SMX] (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
106. Tech Time Warp of the Week: The World’s First Hard Drive, 1956, WIRED
(Jan. 3, 2014, 9:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/01/tech-time-warp-ibm-ramac/
[https://perma.cc/NHC3-MK34].
107. Id.
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than 90% of householders are under the age of 45.108 “Smartphones”
are nearly as ubiquitous, with more than 60% of American adults
owning one.109 That means that some 150 million Americans walk the
streets each day with handheld devices, many of which have more
than three thousand times the capacity of the RAMAC.110 What once
would have required an entire library111 is now contained in a two-
pound block measuring 7 x 4.5 x 1.5 inches.112
In spite of their popularity, hard drives’ inner workings remain un-
known to many people. Similar to cassette tapes of an earlier era, hard
drive storage operates through magnetism.113 The drive consists of
one or more “platters,” on which an electronic arm reads and writes
data.114 Each platter is segmented into distinct tracks containing
smaller sectors.115 “Importantly, for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, ‘[w]hen a file is written to a hard [drive] it is not written
in consecutive sectors. Sectors are scattered all over the disk, organ-
ized as a linked list.’”116 In the physical world, items stored in the
same container will have a certain level of proximity to each other. On
a hard drive, however, documents stored in the same folder may or
may not be written to adjacent sectors.
The Supreme Court has noted that exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement are analyzed in light of the “legiti-
mate governmental interests,” and the degree to which a search in-
trudes an individual’s privacy on the other.117 The relative weight of
these interests in a given case factors substantially in the Court’s deci-
sion. For instance, after a lawful arrest an officer may search the arres-
108. Thom File & Camille Ryan, Computer and Internet Use in the United States:
2013, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2–3 (Nov. 2014), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acs-28.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG7Z-BPF8].
109. Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/ [https://perma.cc/
QA3J-VX3L].
110. See Georgia Dow, 16GB, 32GB, or 64GB: Which iPhone 5 Storage Size Should
You Get?, IMORE (Sept. 13, 2012, 5:22 PM), http://www.imore.com/16gb-32gb-or-64
gb-which-iphone-5-storage-size-should-you-get [https://perma.cc/P4CY-CDAB]. Cf.
WIRED, supra note 106. R
111. See Kerr, supra note 66, at 542 (equating eighty gigabytes—one-twelfth of one R
terabyte—to one floor of a library).
112. Seagate Expansion 5TB Desktop External Hard Drive USB 3.0, AMAZON.COM,
http://www.amazon.com/Seagate-Expansion-Desktop-External-STEB5000100/dp/B00
TKFEEBW/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1456342713&sr=8-1&keywords=5tb [https://
perma.cc/56PW-RRHK] (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).




116. Marc Palumbo, How Safe is Your Data?: Conceptualizing Hard Drives Under
the Fourth Amendment, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 977, 989 (2009) (quoting Stephen J.
Rogowski, Hard Disk, in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 357 (Ed-
win D. Reilly ed., 2004)).
117. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
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tee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s control without a
warrant.118 Protecting the officer from concealed weapons and identi-
fying evidence which the arrestee might attempt to destroy weigh
heavily in favor of the government’s legitimate interests.119 Further, in
a search incident to arrest, the arrestee’s reasonable expectation of
privacy is greatly reduced. The Supreme Court has noted that an ar-
restee’s privacy interest is greatly diminished by the state’s establish-
ment of “dominion” over him.120 With a substantial law enforcement
interest on one side and a reduced privacy interest on the other,
searches incident to arrest have become so commonplace that they are
the norm rather than a Fourth Amendment exception.121
The balance appears to have shifted, however, when the object of
the search involves digital storage—such as a search of an arrestee’s
phone.122 Law enforcement interests, on one hand, are significantly
reduced in the case of a smartphone. The arrestee cannot not use the
data on his or her phone as a weapon, or to resist arrest.123 And once
the phone is confiscated there is minimal further risk of lost or de-
stroyed evidence.124 On the other side of the scale, a modern
smartphone’s vast capacity for potentially private data changes the
weight of the arrestee’s privacy interest, otherwise diminished by the
arrest itself.125 When so much personal information is involved, there
is a much higher privacy interest in the data. A slip of paper with an
accomplice’s number on it is much easier to destroy than a complete
12-month conversation history stored as texts in a smartphone. At the
same time, the conversation history stored on a phone reveals a great
deal more private information than a simple slip of paper. When deal-
ing with digital storage devices, individual privacy interests are height-
ened while law enforcement interests in searching the device may be
diminished.
The modern complexity of digital storage presents conceptual chal-
lenges to courts. In United States v. Crist, one district court ap-
proached the private search doctrine by analyzing the literal segments
of the hard drive “platters” accessed by the government agent.126 This
approach is problematic as applied to subsequent recreations of pri-
vate searches because the virtual display of the storage device—the
visible “file folders”—may give no indication which portions of the
drive have been accessed.127 Further, because a file is not written to
118. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
119. Id. at 225 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969)).
120. Id. at 232 (quoting People v. Chiagles, 142 N.E. 583, 584 (1923)).
121. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482.
122. Id. at 2484.
123. Id. at 2484–85.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. United States v. Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d 575, 586 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
127. See Palumbo, supra note 116, at 989. R
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the hard drive in consecutive sectors, but is “scattered all over the
disk,” data from a single file may be stored on multiple platters.128
Attempting to treat each platter as a closed container, as Crist urges,
would likely require a forensic review of the disk, meaning that law
enforcement would have to exceed the scope of the private search (by
conducting a complete scan of the drive) just to determine the scope
of the private search. Otherwise, a government agent attempting to
recreate a private search would be working blind, with no idea
whether he or she may exceed the scope of the private search and
virtually ensuring a later finding of unreasonable search and/or
seizure.
It appears the only other way to ensure that a subsequent search
does not exceed the scope of a private search would be for the govern-
ment agent to limit the subsequent search to the precise data already
accessed. Even if this would restrict the “search” to the previously
accessed sections of the hard drive, this would merely be the “too
cold” interpretation of Lichtenberger in another guise, falling prey to
the same pitfalls.129
Further undermining its use in the private search context, this tech-
nical approach is unworkable as a practical matter under virtually any
aspect of the Fourth Amendment—a warranted search as well as the
exceptions. Law enforcement could scarcely describe an intended
search with particularity if they had to describe “such and such por-
tion of one platter, and such and such portions of three other plat-
ters.” Unlike, say, reports that a suspect has cocaine in the trunk of his
car, it is practically inconceivable that a warrant request could identify
that a suspect had pirated music files on particular physical portions of
a drive without a prior forensic search. What remains is to determine
what the appropriate approach to digital storage is, if a literal or tech-
nical approach is inapt.
III. “TOO HOT” AND “TOO COLD”
There are two principal ways to address the container doctrine as
applicable to digital storage devices. In the early stages of digital stor-
age, courts treated disks as single containers and maintained this ap-
proach as digital storage developed. United States v. Runyan is an
example of this traditional, “too hot” approach.130 The development
of digital storage technology since Runyan has left its container ap-
proach unworkable. In 2015, the Sixth Circuit decided United States v.
Lichtenberger.131 There, the court effectively limited the digital
“container” to the individual data file.132 This new, “too cold” ap-
128. Id.
129. See infra Section III.B.
130. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001).
131. See United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015).
132. Id.
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proach addresses the privacy concerns of modern digital storage by
strictly limiting the scope of a government search in the digital con-
text. This approach is also unworkable because it effectively prevents
law enforcement from doing their job. After reviewing both the “too
cold” and “too hot” approaches, the reader can better understand the
need for a moderate, “just right” approach.
A. “Too Hot”
Treating each digital storage device or hard drive as a distinct and
singular container is perhaps the most “common sense” approach to
digital storage devices and the private search exception. Each de-
vice—thumb drive, zip drive, or computer—holds “x” data, so it
makes sense on a surface level to treat those bits of data as individual
items in a container. Many, if not most, federal courts have applied
and continue to apply this traditional approach.133
In United States v. Runyan, the Fifth Circuit applied the private
search exception in the context of digital storage.134 It is perhaps the
seminal example of a court considering digital storage and the
container doctrine. After Runyan filed for divorce from his wife
Judith, she returned to Runyan’s ranch home to collect her personal
property.135 Judith and a friend scaled a fence surrounding the ranch
and entered the home through a window.136 There the women discov-
ered a black duffel bag and ammunition boxes in Runyan’s barn.137
The duffel bag and ammunition boxes contained a variety of porno-
graphic items, including a polaroid of an apparent minor.138 While
searching the rest of Runyan’s ranch, Judith also found a desktop
computer, which she claimed belonged to her, “surrounded by 3.5 inch
floppy disks, CDs, and ZIP disks.”139 A friend of Judith reassembled
the computer at Judith’s residence and viewed “approximately
twenty” CDs and floppy disks.140 After finding images of child por-
nography, Judith’s friend contacted the sheriff’s department and
133. See, e.g., United States v. Harling, No. 2:13-cr-96-FtM-38CM, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 107398 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2014) (treating a thumb drive as a container, al-
lowing the police to review its contents more exhaustively than did the private party);
Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2012) (treating a memory card and zip drive
as containers, allowing police to thoroughly review its contents without inquiring
whether the private party had seen all the contents); United States v. Odoni, 782 F.3d
1226 (11th Cir. 2015) (treating a thumb drive as a single container); Runyan, 275 F.3d
449 (5th Cir. 2001) (computer floppy disks). But see United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d
1268 (10th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing modern storage devices from traditional physical
containers such as filing cabinets).
134. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001).
135. Id. at 452.
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turned over more than forty of these storage disks.141 Judith and her
friend viewed only some of the disks and looked at only some of the
images on those disks.142 Law enforcement viewed at least several
images from each disk.143 The trial court denied Runyan’s motion to
suppress this evidence144 and Runyan was convicted of child pornog-
raphy charges.145 The Fifth Circuit addressed Runyan’s argument on
appeal that the police had exceeded the scope of the prior private
search.146
The Fifth Circuit applied the container doctrine to be logically con-
sistent with prior cases and to make a workable rule in real-world
practice. The court first agreed that Runyan had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the computer disks.147 Two questions then needed an
answer: whether police exceeded the scope of the private search when
they examined the entire collection of disks while the private search-
ers had examined only some of the disks; and whether police ex-
ceeded the scope of the private search when they examined more
items on a particular disk that was opened by the private searchers.148
Relying on Jacobsen, the Fifth Circuit held that police must have a
warrant to open a closed container not opened by a private party, un-
less the police have substantial certainty about the contents of the
container “based on the statements of private searchers, their replica-
tion of the private search, and their expertise.”149
Because the police could not have been substantially certain about
the contents of all the disks based only on the fact that all the disks
were discovered in close proximity, the court found that the police
had exceeded the scope of the private search with respect to disks not
viewed by the private party.150 With respect to disks which the private
parties had viewed, however, the court found the police had not ex-
ceeded the scope of the private search.151 The court reasoned that it
“would not have been constitutionally problematic for the police to
have examined more files than did the private searchers” under the
container doctrine.152 Reasoning that “an individual’s expectation of
privacy in the contents of a container has already been compromised
if that container was opened and examined by private searchers,” the
court held that the police remained within the scope of the private
search when they reviewed more items on an a disk than did the pri-
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 454.
144. Id. at 455.
145. Id. at 452.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 458.
148. Id. at 461.
149. Id. at 463.
150. Id. at 464.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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vate party.153 Finding this approach most consistent with Fourth
Amendment precedent, the Fifth Circuit adopted the approach that
police could more thoroughly search digital containers in the same
manner as physical containers, without violating the Fourth
Amendment.154
The Fifth Circuit also found this approach to be the most practical.
The alternative—an item-by-item comparison of the private search
and police search—would result in “a warrantless “search” in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment each time [law enforcement] hap-
pened to find an item within a container that the private searchers did
not happen to find.”155 The Fifth Circuit held instead that all of the
data on those disks previously “opened” by a private searcher was
admissible without a warrant.156 In essence, the Fifth Circuit held that
opening a digital container—like a physical container—exposes its
contents to plain view, and therefore removes the contents’ privacy
expectation. Therefore, no new Fourth Amendment search had taken
place.157
While this approach most closely resembles the physical world of
containers in superficial respects, the ever-growing storage capacity
created by modern technology ensures that this method tips the scales
too far away from protecting private interests. When the police can
gain access to a Library of Congress’ worth of data completely without
a warrant, based solely on a private party reviewing one or two images
on the hard drive, for all practical purposes the police make a general
search.
B. “Too Cold”
Some scholars have raised concerns about the potential vast amount
of information exposed by application of the “traditional” approach to
digital storage.158 In 2015 the Sixth Circuit became the highest federal
court to abandon the “traditional” approach to the container doctrine
and digital storage for a stricter conceptualization—an individual-file-
as-container approach.159 This approach (by far the most restrictive
153. Id. at 464–65.
154. Id. at 464.
155. Id. at 465. But see United States v. Rouse, 148 F.3d 1040, 1041 (8th Cir. 1998).
156. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465.
157. Id.
158. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches
and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 203 (2005). See also
Palumbo, supra note 116, at 980 (claiming that the traditional conceptualization of R
digital storage as a container is inapt in the digital world).
159. Orin Kerr, Sixth Circuit Creates Circuit Split on Private Search Doctrine for
Computers, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 20, 2015), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/20/sixth-circuit-creates-circuit-split-
on-private-search-doctrine-for-computers/?utm_term=.db9a898313d0 [http://
perma.cc/UPW6-W6CT]. See generally United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478
(6th Cir. 2015).
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that has been suggested) avoids the challenges of a literal approach to
the hard drive.160 By limiting the scope of the private search to the
precise data viewed by the private searcher, courts could avoid the
problem that otherwise the visual display of files does not tell the
viewer anything about where, physically, the data is stored in the de-
vice. It is perhaps an understandable reaction to the explosion of digi-
tal storage space in the modern era to guard individual privacy very
closely.
However, this restrictive approach ignores the realities present in a
private search situation and would ultimately nullify the private search
doctrine with respect to digital storage. Lichtenberger itself provides a
clear example of this fact. There, the defendant’s girlfriend made an
allegation to police that the defendant was in possession of child por-
nography, to which an officer responded.161 Friends had warned her
that defendant “had been previously convicted of child pornography
offenses.”162 Police arrested Lichtenberger for failing to register as a
sex offender after responding to his wife’s request to escort him from
their home.163 In response to this shocking turn of events, the wife
began to search Lichtenberger’s personal laptop, which he would
“never let [her] near.”164 The district court seems to describe her
stumbling upon a handful of child pornography images after  “hack-
ing” Lichtenberger’s laptop;165 however, the circuit court notes that
Lichtenberger’s wife testified that “she viewed approximately 100
images of child pornography saved in several subfolders inside a
folder entitled ‘private.’”166 Reading between the lines of the appel-
late case, it appears clear that the girlfriend reviewed a number of
images in a hurry, most likely panicked at the discovery of such
images.167
One of the officers who had responded to her original call returned
to the house and asked Lichtenberger’s girlfriend to show him what
she had discovered.168 Lichtenberger’s girlfriend then began clicking
on images at random.169 She and the officer later testified they did not
know if the images she showed him were the same images she saw in
her initial search.170 In essence, the Sixth Circuit held that the officer
exceeded the scope of the private search, because the girlfriend was
160. See supra Section II.B.




165. Id. (“The laptop was password protected, but Holmes hacked the laptop by
running a password recovery program.”).
166. Id. at 481.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 480.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 488–89.
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unable to precisely retrace her steps.171 Reasoning that there was “no
virtual certainty that [the officer]’s review was limited to the photo-
graphs from [the girlfriend]’s earlier search,”172 the court upheld the
suppression of the child pornography evidence.173 Under the private
search doctrine, it is not clear what reasonable expectation of privacy
Lichtenberger still had in this situation.
Natural adrenaline, panic, and confusion undoubtedly follows the
discovery of criminal activity on a loved one’s computer (not to men-
tion the natural paranoia—“what if they think this is mine?”). It
seems unreasonable to expect the private party to meticulously re-
create the steps they took before and after the discovery of potentially
earth-shaking facts such as those in Lichtenberger. In the end, such an
approach will render the private search doctrine meaningless in the
digital context, as officers will be unwilling to risk the frustration of
their investigation that is sure to follow if the informant makes a slight
misstep. Alternatively, police would only be further encouraged to
conduct investigations with a wink and a nod, suggesting to private
searchers “of course, these are precisely the images you looked at
before and the only images you looked at before”—hardly a desirable
result.
The first step of the Jacobsen analysis is to determine the scope of
the private search and whether the government agent exceeded that
scope in a subsequent search. If the government agent has exceeded
the scope of the private search the court should then determine
whether there was any remaining reasonable expectation of privacy.
Not only did the court in Lichtenberger define the container too nar-
rowly, but it also analyzed the remaining expectation of privacy too
restrictively. By limiting “virtual certainty” to the images actually
viewed by the private searcher, the Sixth Circuit ignored the state-
ments of private searchers and law enforcement’s expertise.174
Strikingly, the Sixth Circuit cited United States v. Bowers as support
for a “near-certainty” standard regarding what law enforcement might
find in expanding on a private search.175 There, a private searcher lo-
cated what appeared to be child pornography in a photo album.176
The police searched the album and arrested the owner.177 However, it
is not clear that the private searcher and the police viewed the same
171. Id.
172. Id. at 488.
173. Id. at 491.
174. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 463 (5th Cir. 2001). See also United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (demonstrating the reduced privacy expecta-
tion resulting from circumstances surrounding the government search).
175. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 486. See United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522,
524–26 (6th Cir. 2010).
176. Bowers, 594 F.3d at 524–25.
177. Id.
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images.178 While the Sixth Circuit was correct to point out the sub-
stantially increased privacy interests involved in digital storage, its ap-
proach to the problem is ultimately unworkable. Based on the
Lichtenberger reasoning, the evidence from Bowers should also have
been suppressed, as there was no indication that the police had viewed
only the images viewed by the private searcher. The police could not
have substantial certainty, therefore, that they would learn something
not already learned in the private search. The Sixth Circuit’s reason-
ing would nullify the private search exception with respect to both
physical and digital containers. Alternatively, such reasoning would
require a case-by-case approach where the scope of the private search
was entirely dependent on the size and nature of the container in-
volved. This approach seems to be at odds with the Supreme Court’s
refusal to distinguish “between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ containers”
with respect to legitimate privacy interests.179
IV. RECOMMENDATION AND OBJECTIONS
A. “Just Right”
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the ongoing question of how
best to limit “this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaran-
teed privacy.”180 This Note has acknowledged that the “traditional”
approach is too broad. Viewing the entire digital storage device as a
single container exposes too much of an individual’s potentially pri-
vate information and is inadequate to protect the individual’s legiti-
mate privacy interests. On the other hand, this Note has argued that
the growing trend to treat the individual file as the container is too
narrow. Such a narrow reading essentially extinguishes the private
search doctrine in the not uncommon situation where a private party
discovers incriminating data on a computer and the police need to
verify the evidence before taking further action.
This Note urges courts to adopt a middle way—the “just right”—
and begin their analysis of warrantless searches subsequent to a pri-
vate search by defining the container “as the virtual file first opened
by the private party.” Then, courts should consider all the facts sur-
rounding the government action to determine whether the officer’s
subsequent acts violated the owner’s reasonable, legitimate privacy in-
terest. As indicated by the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test for
Fourth Amendment searches, this will be a fact intensive analysis,
without convenient bright-line rules. The virtual folder method analo-
gizes well with physical searches, provides law enforcement with a
178. See id. at 524–26.
179. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 47–48 (1988) (quoting United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982)).
180. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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fairly predictable standard to guide them, and balances the legitimate
aims of government against the individual interest in privacy.
We may be hard-pressed to say that a private search of part of a
large digital storage device renders any of its other contents obvious
or exposes them to “plain view.” The Lichtenberger court was accu-
rate in this respect. However, the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning was flawed
for two reasons. First, the court’s application of a very narrow version
of the container doctrine represents an all-or-nothing, black-and-
white approach to the private search exception and container concept.
Second, even assuming arguendo that the individual file was an appro-
priate container, the Lichtenberger court ignored the fact that the ob-
vious character of the device’s contents is not the only factor that may
destroy a reasonable expectation of privacy in such contents.181
Compared to physical containers, it is more difficult to determine
anything about the contents of a digital folder simply by opening the
folder. By their very nature, their contents are often opaque to obser-
vation until a file is opened (although the use of “thumbnails” may
provide more information about pictures in particular). This Note ar-
gues that the partitioned nature of data files in a computer is a circum-
stance that should be considered when determining the scope of a
private search. The literal ability of the police to see all the contents of
a container, however, is not the only ground that could support sub-
stantial certainty. This opacity in the digital realm makes “substantial
certainty” about other files more difficult, but not impossible.
Because people typically store their data grouped in file folders,
they indirectly create a different expectation of privacy in those files
stored together. Computer users could choose to store their data to-
gether in a single large folder, or on the desktop. Most people, how-
ever, do not store their data this way. The reality is that people
typically store similar items together, much as they do with physical
items. Being stored in close proximity is not sufficient to give searches
“substantial certainty,”182 but the use of folders in the digital world
that is very similar to the physical world reinforces that the container
doctrine is still apt with respect to digital storage. In both cases, there
is an understanding that by storing items together, you link access to
these items. If one stores all one’s jewelry in a box, then there is a
reasonable expectation that another person who accesses the box will
effectively access all of the jewelry, not just particular pieces they
physically touch or see.
We should not change the nature of our Fourth Amendment analy-
sis simply because the subject of a search is a digital storage device.183
Delineating the scope of a private search at the file folder level seems
181. See supra Section II.A.2.
182. See United States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1992).
183. Clancy, supra note 158, at 195–96. R
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a reasonable place to draw the line and it balances the public interest
in law enforcement against the individual privacy interest. Of course, a
judge may ex post determine that the size of the folder was so large
that the owner retained some legitimate privacy interest in the data
within that folder. The same could apply to a large physical container;
a court could reasonably hold that the private search doctrine does
not completely justify a warrantless search. And officers must exercise
care by obtaining a warrant as soon as they reasonably can, in order to
prevent further warrantless invasion of privacy.
B. Objections
Challenges are expected to this middle-ground approach. While the
virtual folder method may have its own shortcomings, it is the ap-
proach that best considers both private and public interests.
1. This Approach is too Fact-Intensive and Will Muddy the Waters
for Law Enforcement
Opponents may argue that this Note’s emphasis on the particular
circumstances surrounding a subsequent search would lead to uncer-
tainty in police searches. The Supreme Court’s avowed preference for
categorical rules to guide law enforcement gives weight to this posi-
tion.184 Analysis that considers the totality of the circumstances could
prove murky for law enforcement. However, the Court has also af-
firmed that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness.’”185 The Fourth Amendment protects against “un-
reasonable” searches and seizures. Consequently, where a private
search has destroyed a reasonable expectation of privacy, a govern-
ment search is inherently reasonable; in fact, it is not a search at all, to
the extent it does not exceed the scope of the private search. Any
inquiry so focused on “reasonableness” will necessarily be fact-inten-
sive. Indeed, it may be that the Fourth Amendment is resistant to gen-
eral, bright-line rules by its very nature, at least with respect to
anything but the broadest strokes.186 The nearly limitless possible
combinations of circumstances practically demand case-by-case analy-
sis.187 If a “search” is initiated by surveillance of a glass-walled public
telephone booth,188 but not of an open field on private property,189 it
stands to reason that applying the private search doctrine will require
184. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
185. Id. at 2482 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
186. Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits
of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149,
1197–2000 (1998) (describing the Fourth Amendment as a “spontaneous system” akin
to the common law, amenable to gradual, incremental change, but not to a rigorous
analytical breakdown).
187. See id. at 1198–99.
188. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
189. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
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a deeper analysis than simply tabbing a digital file as a “container”
and excluding any search that fails to recreate the prior private search.
Some might accuse this Note’s “reasonableness” aspect of being as
dangerous to the container doctrine as the Lichtenberger decision. Be-
cause the ultimate basis for Fourth Amendment questions is “reasona-
bleness,”190 an argument could be made that the container doctrine is
inapt in the digital context. While some may advocate for a return to
fundamental Fourth Amendment principles,191 this Note does not pro-
pose anything so drastic as dispensing with current jurisprudence on
the private search exception. This Note instead advocates a middle
ground that harmonizes both principle (balancing competing Fourth
Amendment interests) and practice (the traditional container doc-
trine) while leaving modern courts flexibility to adjust to particular
circumstances in their evidentiary rulings.
Guidelines under the Fourth Amendment should facilitate, not hin-
der, law enforcement in performing their duties.192 Therefore, al-
though categorical rules may be preferred, they should not carry the
day if they create confusion or doubt for law enforcement, or other-
wise tie their hands in carrying out legitimate police interests.
The private search doctrine would not be the first exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s resistance to bright-line rules. Considering the
“open field” exception, the Supreme Court adopted a factor test—
considering all the relevant circumstances—for “extent-of-curtilage-
questions” rather than develop a categorical formula to determine the
boundary between a landowner’s “open field” and his “home” for
Fourth Amendment purposes.193 The Court “decline[d] the Govern-
ment’s invitation to adopt a ‘bright-line rule.’”194 Simply put, some
applications of the Fourth Amendment are ruled by “common sense
and ordinary human experience” rather than bright-line rules.195
The Supreme Court has consistently held that police searches are
presumptively unreasonable unless sanctioned by a warrant issued by
a magistrate, based on probable cause, and in consideration of the
totality of the circumstances.196 This warrant, and the probable cause
on which it is based, limit the scope of a warranted search. Thus all of
190. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
191. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
192. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491–92 (emphasizing the importance of clear guidance to
law enforcement). See also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181 (declining to analyze the “open
field” doctrine on a case-by-case basis on the grounds that “police officers would have
to guess before every search” whether their acts would fall under the Fourth
Amendment).
193. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
194. Id. at 301, n.4.
195. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) (discussing duration of
Terry stops).
196. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055–56 (2013) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213 (1983)).
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the circumstances relating to the search must be considered in setting
its scope. In the context of a private search, determining the appropri-
ate scope similarly limits the law enforcement search.197 It seems only
appropriate to similarly consider all the circumstances surrounding a
search to determine its lawful scope. This Note’s approach does so by
selecting a “just right” middle ground to start the analysis (thus pro-
viding clear guidance to law enforcement recreating private searches).
Then, the court may post hoc examine the circumstances surrounding
the search. It may be that the file folder involved was so large that the
container doctrine could not reasonably be applied. Alternatively,
there may be indicators such as folder title, file titles, or other circum-
stances that would create virtual certainty of the contents of other file
folders than those opened by the private searcher.
2. This Approach Ignores the Literal Reality of Digital Storage
One of the obvious challenges for courts is sorting out the best way
to conceptualize hard drives in the context of the Fourth Amend-
ment.198 This challenge is exacerbated by the fact that the literal real-
ity of a hard drive does not match up with the virtual reality of a
computer display.199 Particularly in terms of the private search excep-
tion, courts must determine whether to aim for a concept of the digital
storage that closely matches the reality of the device, or one that re-
flects the reality of the virtual display that officers and judges will be
forced to deal with. By attempting to restrict the overbroad approach
of Runyan, this Note’s approach, while not closely matching the digi-
tal storage reality, best safeguards the competing aims of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence—individual privacy and law enforcement
aims.
Judges are well-advised against delving too deeply into subjects on
which they are not experts.200 In Crist, for example, it seems fair to
wonder if the court had a full understanding of how hard drives work
when it attempted to divide a hard drive in a way at odds with the
reality of data storage—the result of which was an unworkable and
ultimately inconsequential rule.201 In that vein, shouldn’t the rules or
guidelines established for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence be acces-
sible to judges and attorneys who will try such matters, and make
sense to lay police officers who must work under such rules? This
Note’s proposition is a more restrictive conceptualization of digital
197. See supra Section II.A.1.
198. See generally Palumbo, supra note 116 (noting the challenges of various R
conceptualizations).
199. See id. at 988–89.
200. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 958 (2005) (noting that
“[j]udges have no specialized technical ability to answer questions about present or
future technological feasibility”).
201. See Palumbo, supra note 116, at 997–98. See also United States v. Crist, 627 F. R
Supp. 2d 575, 586 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
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containers, better protecting individual privacy than the broad “tradi-
tional” approach. However, the common-sense nature of the virtual
file conceptualization serves the legitimate ends of law enforcement
far better than stricter approaches which unreasonably hamper the
police.
It is beyond the scope of this Note to fully analyze the technical
operation of digital storage devices. Some have argued that the reali-
ties of digital storage are so drastically different from physical
searches and seizures that we cannot draw a fair analogy.202 However,
as digital security measures continue to develop alongside digital stor-
age, that may not be the case. Passwords can function as locked doors,
partitioning as separate rooms, and encryption as further security. In
many ways digital storage becomes more analogous to physical space
as technology develops, particularly with respect to the virtual display
accessed by the user. If this is the case, then our traditional concepts
of Fourth Amendment doctrines may in fact serve us well in the digi-
tal world.
The court in Crist, along with commentators make a great deal
about the complexity of the literal process underlying the visual dis-
play of a digital device.203 Under a warranted search, where law en-
forcement might conduct a full forensic analysis of the digital storage
device, this distinction is more relevant. Under a warrant authorizing
a search for a particular type of data, for instance, it is conceivable
that police would exceed the scope of the warrant by creating a “hash
value” of portions of the hard drive where they had no reason to think
evidence of a crime was stored. However, under any but the laxest
standard for the private search exception—or unless the private party
conducted his or her own forensic analysis—such a detailed search of
a digital device would exceed the scope of the private search. There-
fore, the distinction of the literal reality of the digital storage and the
virtual display is less urgent with respect to the private search
exception.
If a method fairly analogizes the digital storage universe in lay
terms without unreasonably infringing privacy interests, should we ig-
nore such an analogy based solely on the fact that it is not strictly
accurate in terms of the opaque mechanical processes of modern tech-
nology? The over-emphasis of arcane minutiae ignores the practical
realities of law enforcement “on the ground.” Private citizens may
often be flustered by the discovery of criminal data on a friend or
loved one’s computer. It hardly seems reasonable to demand that they
be able to exactly recreate their search in order to satisfy the
technophile’s conception of what most closely replicates the unseen
reality of modern hard-drive technology.
202. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 66, at 533. R
203. See id.; see also Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 584–87.
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Courts and scholars alike have noted the challenges of conceptualiz-
ing containers in the digital world, some going so far as advocating
abrogation of the principle altogether with respect to digital
searches.204 Without a doubt, the challenges are well-noted. However,
completely abandoning the container concept would effectively nullify
the private search doctrine. Without some conceptualization of the
container doctrine, law enforcement would only be able to review the
precise files searched by the private party. As Lichtenberger demon-
strates, the result of this approach is harsh. What this Note attempts to
do is to identify workable parameters for containers in the digital
world while staying true to the principles underpinning the Fourth
Amendment.
While it is true that digital storage amounts to a dramatically larger
type of storage than a physical container, it is not clear that it there-
fore amounts to an entirely different type of thing. In both the physical
and the digital world, citizens may secret away things they would
rather not have public, thus creating a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In both cases that expec-
tation of privacy may be frustrated by the fact of another private
individual’s snooping. In the physical world, accessing a closed
container frustrates the owner’s privacy interest in the contents of the
container, not because the private party looks at each and every item,
but because by placing those items together in a closed container, the
owner has essentially linked his or her expectation of privacy in each
item together. So, for instance, if a private party opened another’s
foot locker and saw a severed head laying on top of other objects and
immediately ran to call the police, the police would most likely be
permitted to take more time and review the contents of the locker
more thoroughly. By grouping things together for storage, the owner
reasonably must expect that someone able to see one thing would also
be able to see the other things stored with it. The scope of the private
search, seen this way, has more to do with what the private party
could have seen, rather than identifying what the party, in fact, saw.
This principle applies as well to the digital world as to the physical.
What then to do about containers within containers? With the ex-
ception of identical packages within the same container, where the
204. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating
that reliance on container analogies may “oversimplify a complex area of Fourth
Amendment doctrines”); Palumbo, supra note 116, at 980 (positing that characteriza- R
tion of hard drives as containers is not viable); Benjamin Holley, Note, Digitizing the
Fourth Amendment: Limiting the Private Search Exception in Computer Investigations,
96 VA. L. REV. 677, 702 (2010) (calling the container analysis “entirely unpersuasive
in the virtual realm”); Clancy, supra note 158, at 202–03 (2005) (noting concerns R
about applicability of the container doctrine in the digital world); Crist, 627 F. Supp.
2d at 586 (rejecting the argument that a computer is analogous to a container); United
States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2015) (focusing only on the “vir-
tual certainty” of the officer and effectively ignoring the container concepts).
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identity of one opened package “spoke volumes” about the remaining
packages,205 there appears to be agreement that a private search of a
container does not per se frustrate the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy of containers therein.206 In principle, this concept is related to the
fact that the steps one takes to maintain privacy are related to what
reasonable expectation of privacy one has,207 and serves to limit the
otherwise broad scope of the container doctrine. Each container rep-
resents a distinct attempt to take precautions against prying eyes, and
therefore suggests a fresh expectation of privacy, which is not de-
feated by opening the larger container.
This Note’s recommendation that courts use the virtual file folder as
a container meshes well with this view of containers generally. By
searching and turning over a laptop to the police, a private search has
severely compromised the owner’s expectation of privacy in the
laptop’s contents. However, various virtual layers of protection within
the digital world limit the exposure of vast amounts of private data.
Although the real-world mechanism of digital storage makes a physi-
cal container approach unworkable,208 data owners do make choices
about grouping data together that closely resemble physical reality.
Relatedly, as technology advances further, it may be that the digital
world will continue to resemble the physical world more and more.
Most operating systems are premised on groupings of folders.209
There are “how-to” articles laying out the most efficient way to ar-
range files into various folders210 and studies on the various ways sub-
jects use digital file folders.211 In fact, despite the very different ways
in which they operate, digital storage devices are functionally very
similar to physical containers. Technically, a hard drive disk is “mag-
netic recording material . . . layered onto a high-precision aluminum
or glass disk . . . then polished to mirror-type smoothness.”212 In prac-
205. United States v. Bowman, 907 F.2d 63, 65 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121 (1984)).
206. See United States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that
police exceeded the scope of a private search of a closet when they opened a bag—
which the private party had not searched—inside the closet); United States v. Don-
nes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1436 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that opening a camera lens case
within a glove searched by a private party constituted a new search).
207. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S 445, 454 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“If they do not take . . .  precautions, they cannot reasonably expect privacy.”).
208. See discussion supra Section II.B.
209. Computer File, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Computer_file (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/3KVB-6SBR].
210. See K.J. McCorry, How to Organize Computer Documents, OFFICIENCY, http://
computerorganizing.com/ [https://perma.cc/7YME-4B4Z].
211. See Christopher S.G. Khoo et al., How Users Organize Electronic Files on
Their Workstations in the Office Environment: A Preliminary Study of Personal Infor-
mation Organization Behavior, 11 INFO. RES. (2007), http://www.informationr.net/ir/
12-2/paper293.html [https://perma.cc/8YKW-4AFS].
212. Brain, supra note 113. R
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tice, “a computer is a container of containers of documents.”213 Much
as they do in the physical world, individuals tend to group items or
information together in containers.
By storing digital data in folders, individuals manifest a linked ex-
pectation of privacy, similar to that manifested in physical contain-
ers.214 It is reasonable, therefore, to treat data stored in a container as
being in “plain view” once a private searcher has opened that
container.215 How to best apply the container doctrine in the digital
realm is a more appropriate question than whether the container doc-
trine is applicable to digital storage at all.
Other aspects of digital storage—such as passwords, hidden files,
and encryption—provide very reasonable analogies to locked doors,
walls, physical containers, and other real-world security measures. In
the virtual world now, it is increasingly true, as in the physical world,
“[i]ndividuals who seek privacy can take precautions . . . to avoid dis-
closing private activities to those who pass by.”216 And as such, courts
are more entitled to argue that “If they do not take such precautions,
they cannot reasonably expect privacy from public observation.”217
A file folder standard for containers harmonizes with the principle
that a private intrusion should not open the door to a general
search,218 while giving police the practical flexibility they need to
gather evidence. The traditional container view would admittedly al-
low the former, while the suggested strict approach would frustrate
the latter, and prevent law enforcement from making use of informa-
tion “freely made available.”219
The Supreme Court has wrestled with the changing face of technol-
ogy for much of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.220 It has used
these challenges to refine Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in light of
the fundamental goal of protecting privacy while enabling the state to
preserve the security of the people. The approach of the Sixth Circuit
in Lichtenberger represents in practice a wholesale change rather than
a refinement.
213. Clancy, supra note 158. R
214. See supra Section II.A.1.
215. See id.
216. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 454 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
217. Id.
218. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980).
219. United States v. Harling, No. 2:13-cr-96-FtM-38CM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107398, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2014).
220. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (thermal-imaging technology);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (telephone bug). See also Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445 (1989) (helicopter); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (fixed-
wing aircraft); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (recording device).
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3. This Approach Overstates the Fallout from Lichtenberger
Opponents may argue that this Note goes too far in claiming that
Lichtenberger would completely nullify the private search doctrine
with respect to digital storage. But the realities of obtaining a warrant
demonstrate this, particularly with respect to “possession” charges,
such as possession of child pornography. To be sure, obtaining a war-
rant as early as possible is the best option for law enforcement. How-
ever, as an initial matter, officers must make a judgment call on what
evidence they will need to obtain a warrant to search further. Com-
monly, the officer will need to observe the evidence of criminal activ-
ity him- or herself.221 Once there is evidence sufficient for a warrant,
the officer would be wise to discontinue recreating a private search.
However, the Sixth Circuit will necessarily place officers in a position
of having received a report of criminal possession, unable to obtain a
warrant without first viewing the alleged material, but at risk of losing
the case if the private party who initiated the search makes an error in
recollection.
For instance, suppose slightly different facts for the Donnes case.
Rather than a glove with a syringe and lens case in it, suppose that the
private party had discovered a glove with two lens cases in it. The
private party then opens one lens case and discovers apparent contra-
band. The private party leaves the glove for a moment and contacts a
police officer to come to the scene. Once there, the police officer asks
the private party to show him what he found. By mistake, the private
party opens up the wrong lens case. Under the Lichtenberger reason-
ing, the evidence of contraband in the first lens case would be sup-
pressed and the owner would go free because of an error in the
recollection of the private party—ironically just the sort of thing that
the Supreme Court has used to justify the private search doctrine.222
V. CONCLUSION
Modern technology allows individuals to gather unprecedented
amounts of data together in one place. Data a person fifty years ago
would have kept in a box, or filing cabinet, or even a library, now fits
in a block the size of a legal textbook. This level of storage creates a
constitutional “too hot” scenario under the Goldilocks Principle. If
courts conceptualize a storage device as a single closed “container”
under the Fourth Amendment, the owner’s privacy expectation in the
entire device would be frustrated by a third party viewing any part of
it. Police could conceivably use the private search exception to gain
access to unthinkable amounts of private information. If courts con-
221. What Is a Search Warrant and What Does It Take to Get One?, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE FAQ, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/search-seizure-faq-
29092-3.html [https://perma.cc/34SS-NR72].
222. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119 (1984).
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ceptualize individual files as distinct containers, conversely, an unac-
ceptable “too cold” scenario arises. Law enforcement could only view
the identical files viewed by a private searcher, or risk exclusion of the
evidence. The private search exception would be effectively annihi-
lated in the digital world just as digital storage of incriminating evi-
dence has become the norm. Much like Goldilocks, we must find a
“just right” conceptualization.
This Note’s “just right” approach would treat each virtual folder as
a container for Fourth Amendment purposes. This conceptualization
remains true to the heart of the Fourth Amendment and the private
search exception. By allowing courts flexibility in setting the scope of
the private search, this conceptualization is consistent with the “rea-
sonableness” standard that underlies the Fourth Amendment. Addi-
tionally, this middle ground is consistent with the traditional private
search exception rationale. Police should not be effectively forced to
avert their eyes from evidence brought by a third party, as would hap-
pen under the strict “too cold” conceptualization. Neither should the
police conduct a sweeping general search, however, as is risked by the
broad “too hot” conceptualization. Finally, the “just right” approach
appropriately balances the government’s law enforcement interests
against individual privacy interests. The increased data storage of digi-
tal devices weighs heavily for privacy interests in this balance. The
everyday use of file folders to organize and store data on the virtual
desktop, however, has altered the typical expectation of privacy in
data files within the same folder. This is similar to linking privacy ex-
pectations in multiple items stored in a single container.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\4-2\TWL202.txt unknown Seq: 32 21-AUG-17 11:38
